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I  Introduction 
The food retail market is characterized by a large degree of price dispersion instead of the 
“law of one price”. Empirical studies, such as Pesendorfer (2002), Sexton, Zhang, and 
Chalfant (SZC, 2003), and Hosken and Reiffen (2004a, 2004b), document a remarkable 
degree of cross-sectional price dispersion among food retailers within a SMSA and 
intertemporal price variations for a given retailer. However, variations in retail prices 
seem loosely related to changes in wholesale prices (MacDonald, 2000; Chevalier, 
Kashyap, and Rossi, 2003; SZC, 2003; Hosken and Reiffen, 2004a, 2004b). The isolation 
of retail price setting from cost factors is magnified by temporary price reductions, which 
are a very important aspect of retail pricing (Hosken and Reiffen, 2004a). Empirical 
evidence suggests that temporary price reductions mainly reflect changes in the retail 
margins (i.e., sales) rather than changes in costs (MacDonald, 2000; Chevalier, Kashyap, 
and Rossi, 2003; SZC, 2003; Hosken and Reiffen, 2004a, 2004b). Theories, such as those 
developed by Salop and Stiglitz (1977, 1982), Varian (1980), Sobel (1984), Lal and 
Matutes (1994), and Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004b), explain retail price dispersion 
and the sale phenomenon as the result of retailers being able to price discriminate. 
However, many important aspects of retail pricing still remain unexplained (Hosken and 
Reiffen, 2004a).  
The primary goal of this paper is to study retailer pricing behavior, in particular 
temporary price reductions and sales, for differentiated products. It is a common 
observation that only a small fraction of numerous goods carried by retailers are offered 
at low “sale” prices each week, and those selected items tend to change from time to time. 
Hosken and Reiffen (2004a) find that the typical grocery product has a “regular” price,   3
and that most deviations from the regular price are downward and short-lived. They also 
show that temporary price reductions account for 20 to 50 percent of annual variations in 
retail prices for most grocery items. Prior studies suggest that temporary price reductions 
are attributable to retailer sale strategies, which result in decreases in margins rather than 
decreases in costs (MacDonald, 2000; Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi, 2003; SZC, 2003; 
Hosken and Reiffen, 2004a, 2004b). We define a sale as a special form of temporary 
price reduction, when the retail margin for a product decreases when the retailer reduces 
the product’s price.
 1,2 
In differentiated product markets, a product category usually comprises a number 
of substitute subcategories and/or brands. Empirical evidence suggests that retailer 
pricing behavior differs across brands within a product category (Agrawal, 1996; SZC, 
2003; Hosken and Reiffen, 2004b). We study retailer pricing behavior for bagged salads. 
Driven by consumers’ demand for convenience, variety, and quality, the bagged salad 
market has become highly differentiated. The bagged salad market consists of four 
subcategories, and three major national brands and private labels. Calvin et al. (2001) 
report that 55 firms sold 197 bagged salad items in mainstream supermarkets in 1993, 
with total sales of $197 million. In 1999, 54 firms sold 459 items, with sales of $1.3 
billion. SZC (2003) show that retailers set prices of different brands differently for 
iceberg-based bagged salads, and there is no evidence of coordination among retailers in 
setting prices. Their empirical evidence also suggests a nearly complete absence of a 
                                                 
1 We define that sales occur only when retail prices decrease. This excludes the cases where the retail price 
of a product remains unchanged when its purchasing price increases, or where the increase in the retail 
price of a product is less than the increase in its purchasing price. 
2 Studies, such as Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004a, 2004b) and Pesendorfer (2002), consider temporary 
price reductions the same as sales. They define that a temporary price reduction or a sale occurs when the 
retail price of a product is more than 10 or 20 percent off its regular price.   4
relationship between the farm-level price for iceberg lettuce and retail prices for iceberg-
based bagged salads. 
Models, such as those developed by Lal and Matutes (1994), Agrawal (1996), Lal 
and Villas-Boas (1998), and Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004b), explain the sale 
phenomenon as the result of retailer strategic behavior (e.g., retailer strategies to price 
discriminate). We draw empirical implications from various theories of retailer sale 
strategies, in particular those for differentiated products, and trade practices in the bagged 
salad market. One of the questions we will analyze is the extent to which temporary price 
reductions are the result of changes in the retail margins, rather than changes in costs. 
Factors that potentially explain temporary price reductions will be examined. In particular, 
cost variations are distinguished from other factors associated with retailer sale strategies, 
such as product popularity and retail competition. We look into the frequency and the 
depth of temporary price reductions and sales using retailer scanner data provided by 
Information Resource Inc. (IRI). 
Prospective contributions of the present study are the following:  First, most 
empirical studies on retailer pricing behavior, such as Giulietti and Waterson (1997), 
Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003), and Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004a, 2004b), 
have emphasized broad product categories. Retailer pricing behavior for differentiated 
products, the focus of the present study, has heretofore received little attention. Second, 
although various studies have reached the conclusion that temporary price reductions and 
sales are important aspects of retailer pricing behavior, few have formally modeled 
retailers’ decisions on temporary price reductions and/or sales. Third, retailer pricing 
behavior for storable goods has been widely analyzed, but behavior for perishable   5
products has been little explored, and understanding retailer pricing strategies for these 
products has particular interest to agricultural producers. 
In the following section, we summarize empirical implications from various 
theories of retailer sale strategies and trade practices in the bagged salad market. The 
empirical framework is presented in section two, followed by discussion of the data in the 
last section. 
 
II  Empirical Implications from Retailer Pricing Theories and Industry Trade 
Practices 
Attempts have been made in the marketing and economics literature to explain the sale 
phenomenon. First, Lal and Matutes (1994) and Hosken and Reiffen (2004b) predict that 
the products that are more popular are more likely to be on sale than other products. The 
more popular products are interpreted as those with higher demands (Lal and Matutes, 
1994; Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi, 2003; Hosken and Reiffen, 2004b). Lal and 
Matutes (1994) develop a model to analyze the optimal pricing and advertising policies 
by multiproduct retailers. They focus on the markets where demands for different 
products are independent of each other but are linked through consumers’ one-stop 
shopping. Lal and Matutes suggest that holding the number of advertised products fixed, 
the items appealing to a broad range of consumers are more likely to be on sale and 
advertised in order to attract consumers into the store. Hosken and Reiffen (2004b) 
extend Lal and Matutes’ analysis by introducing three products, two of them substitutes, 
and the third with demand independent of the other two. They define that the more 
popular products are those with higher market shares. Hosken and Reiffen predict that   6
there should be considerable variations in the sale frequency within a group of substitute 
products, and the more popular items are on sale more frequently. MacDonald (2000), 
Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003), and Hosken and Reiffen (2004b) study retailer 
pricing behavior for broad product categories. They find that retail prices are lowest 
during periods of peak demand, which supports Lal and Matutes’ prediction about the 
positive relationship between product popularity and its probability of being on sale. 
Hosken and Reiffen (2004b) further show that within a product category, the sale 
probabilities for substitute products are positively correlated to the market shares of the 
products. 
Second, retail competition and retailers’ characteristics are potentially important 
factors that influence retailers’ sale decisions. In the models of Lal and Matutes (1994) 
and Hosken and Reiffen (2004b), retailers’ motivation to conduct sales and advertising is 
that retailers compete with each other for consumers’ store patronage. Lal and Villas-
Boas (1998) study retailer price promotions and manufacturer trade deals in the markets 
where retailers maximize profits of a product category that comprises multiple brands. 
First, the model implies that competition between retailers is the fundamental driver for 
retailer sale strategies. The model indicates that the primary goal of price reductions by 
retailers is to attract consumers who travel around stores seeking the best deals (store 
switchers) rather than consumers who switch between brands (brand switchers). Second, 
the authors conclude that promotions across brands are not independent. When price 
promotions are applied, promotions across brands can be either positively correlated, i.e., 
retailers conduct deep or light price promotions for all the brands in the category, or 
negatively correlated, i.e., retailers always heavily promote one brand at one time. The   7
market structure determines the promotion pattern.
3  In the case where consumers’ 
shopping decision is dominated by choice in stores rather than choice in brands (i.e., 
there are no consumers who travel around stores to buy the preferred brand at the lowest 
price), retailers cut price of one brand at one time, and the promoted brand is the lowest 
priced brand. We can expect that this situation is plausible for bagged salads. Moreover, 
Lal and Rao (1997) and Boatwright, Dhar, and Rossi (2004) suggest that retailers’ 
characteristics, such as Hi-Lo-Pricing or Every-Day-Low-Pricing store formats, are 
important factors that explain retailer pricing strategies. 
Third, substitution patterns between brands may affect retailers’ sale decisions. 
Lal and Villas-Boas (1998) did not model the differences in brands (the brands in their 
model are symmetric), e.g., the stronger brand that has a higher consumer loyalty requires 
smaller discounts to attract the loyal consumers of the weaker brand to switch than the 
weaker brand does (Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal, 1990; Agrawal, 1996). However, we can 
expect that substitution patterns between brands, and/or the differences in the degree of 
loyalty across brands could have an impact on retailers’ sale decisions. Agrawal (1996) 
shows that a monopoly retailer promotes the stronger brand more often but provides a 
smaller price discount for it compared to the weaker brand. In contrast, Lal and Villas-
Boas (1998) predict that retailers do not conduct price discounts in the absence of retail 
competition. It is not easy to obtain an appropriate and consistent measurement for the 
“strength” of different brands. Instead, we will study retailer pricing strategies for 
national brands and private labels by assuming that national brands are stronger relative 
to private labels. Narasimhan (1988), Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal (1990), Rao (1991), and 
                                                 
3 The market structure is determined by the relative sizes of the various market segments in terms of loyalty 
to manufacturers, retailers, or manufacturer-retailer pairs.   8
Agrawal (1996) predict that retailers are least motivated to conduct price promotions for 
private labels and tend to keep them at stable low prices. 
Fourth, demand and cost variations that potentially explain temporary price 
reductions will be analyzed, in particular demand and supply seasonality and changes in 
the farm-level prices for lettuce. Lettuce production and shipments are concentrated in 
California and Arizona. Nearly all the lettuce consumed in the U.S. is produced 
domestically. Nearly 97 percent of lettuce was produced in California and Arizona during 
1992 and 1999 on average. All the leading bagged salad manufacturers have processing 
plants in California. Further, California-based shippers constitute virtually the entire 
population of lettuce shippers that supply the domestic U.S. market (Glaser, Thompson, 
and Handy, 2001).  Therefore, we can examine the effects of changes in lettuce prices at 
the farm level on changes in the prices for lettuce and bagged salads at the retail level. 
Further, we will investigate whether and how retailer pricing behavior varies for lettuce, 
and national brands and private labels of bagged salads. Glaser, Thompson, and Handy 
(2001) suggest that trade practices between shippers and retailers for bagged salads have 
effectively muted the transmission of seasonal supply shocks from the farm level to the 
retail level compared to lettuce. Moreover, the length and characteristics of marketing 
channels differ between lettuce and bagged salads and between national brands and 
private labels of bagged salads. These differences could influence retailer pricing 
strategies for these products. 
   9
III  Retailer Pricing Behavior for Bagged Salads and Lettuce 
1.  The data 
Our empirical analysis is based on the retailer scanner data provided by Information 
Resources Inc. (IRI) and the shipping-point price information available from the USDA 
Federal-State Market News Service (F-SMNS). The retailer scanner data include weekly 
data on varieties of head lettuce and bagged salads for twenty retail accounts in six U.S. 
cities from January 1998 through December 1999. A retail account is defined as a 
particular market-retailer combination, e.g., retailer 1 in Chicago. Bagged salads are 
organized by universal product classification (UPC) codes, and head lettuce products are 
recorded by price lookup (PLU) codes. For each account and each UPC or PLU code, IRI 
provided weekly volume and dollar sales, retail prices, and the number of stores within 
the chain selling the product in the city.  
Bagged salads consist of traditional iceberg-based salads, various salad blends 
featuring a combination of lettuce types, salad kits containing both fresh-cut salads and 
salad dressing, and organic salads. Iceberg-based salads and salad blends are included in 
our study.
4 We analyze three major national brands—Dole, Fresh Express, and Ready 
Pac, and private labels, which accounted for more than 90 percent of the market share in 
1999 according to Calvin et al. (2001) and our data. An unbranded product, fresh cut 
salads carried by two retail accounts, is considered. It accounted for over 70 percent of 
stores sales. Lettuce, iceberg, romaine, red leaf and green leaf, are also included in our 
analysis. Lettuce will provide helpful comparison, in that lettuce is relatively 
                                                 
4 Salad kits are not analyzed in the study for the following reasons. Products in the salad kit category 
changed frequently during the study period, which incurred series issues of missing values. Furthermore, 
product description of many UPC codes of salad kits are missing and cannot be found. Therefore, it is 
difficult to deal with such codes without basic information, such as size and ingredients.   10
homogenous and close to the raw agricultural product compared to bagged salads, and 
trade practices between shippers and retailers and retailer pricing strategies are different 
between lettuce and bagged salads (Glaser, Thompson, and Handy, 2001; SZC, 2003). 
The weekly shipping point prices on varieties of lettuce are obtained from USDA 
F-SMNS. Price information on five major varieties, iceberg, romaine, red lead, green leaf, 
and Boston lettuce, are used to capture the changes in retail purchasing costs. We do not 
have information on purchasing prices at the retail level, which are confidential and may 
differ across retailer due to the specific contracts between retailers and grower/shippers. 
Glaser, Thompson, and Handy (2001) and crop profile information from the USDA 
Regional IPM Centers Information System suggest that majority of lettuce are sold 
through contracts rather than in terminal wholesale markets.
5 In addition, lettuce is highly 
perishable. It typically takes three to six days for lettuce to be harvested in the field to be 
on shelves in supermarkets in the U.S. according the crop profiles. Shipping-point prices 
represent open (spot) market sales by first handlers on product of generally good quality 
and condition unless otherwise stated.
6 The truck rates remained quite stable during the 
study period according the information from USDA Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS). Therefore, shipping-point price could capture changes in the retail purchasing 
costs. 
We construct shipping-point price series for each one of retail products in our 
analysis. There are 49 UPC codes for bagged salads, and 4 PLU codes for lettuce. In 
particular, the average shipping-point prices of lettuce are according to product 
                                                 
5 The crop profiles for varieties of lettuce are available from http://www.ipmcenters.org/cropprofiles.  
6 Shipping-point prices may include promotional allowances or other incentives. No consideration is given 
to after-sale adjustments unless otherwise stated. Brokerage fees paid by the shipper are included in the 
price reported.   11
ingredients. California produces approximately 72 percent of the iceberg lettuce and 81 
percent of leaf lettuce (including romaine, red leaf, green leaf, and Boston lettuce) grown 
in U.S. California and Arizona account for approximately 98 percent of iceberg 
production and 97 percent leaf lettuce production in U.S. Production in Arizona occurs 
primarily between late December and early March, when production in California is low. 
Arizona provides as much as 85 percent of the lettuce for U.S. markets during the winter 
months. Thus, price information on lettuce shipped from Arizona is used  during the 
winter months, and price information on lettuce shipping from California is used during 
the rest of the year. Particular timing differ across different varieties of lettuce.  
2.  Characteristics of retailer pricing behavior for bagged salads and lettuce 
Table 1 reports the overview statistics of retail prices and shipping-point prices by 
category and brand. Prices are measured by $/unit for bagged salads, and $/head for head 
lettuce both at retail and shipping-point level. For iceberg-based bagged (IBB) salads, 
mean prices for Dole and Fresh Express are close and at a higher level compared with 
those for Ready Pack, private labels, and fresh-cut IBB salads. Retail prices for three 
national brands vary to larger extent relative to those for private labels and fresh-cut IBB 
salads. Fresh-cut IBB salads have the least variations in bagged salad category. Statistics 
for fresh-cut IBB salads are similar to those for iceberg head lettuce. Retail prices of 
salad blends for national brands are less variable than those for private labels. There are 
more variations in retail prices for IBB salads than those for salad blends. Volume shares 
of IBB salads account for 78 percent of bagged salads (salad kits are excluded) according 
to our data. This may suggest that the price variability of IBB salads is attributable to 
retailers’ sales strategies, i.e., putting production with high demand on sales to attract   12
customers into the store (Lal and Matutues, 1994; Hosken and Reiffen, 2001, 2004b). 
Furthermore, retail prices for private label and fresh-cut IBB salads have a lower mean 
and variance than those for national brands. This may support the prediction by 
Narasimhan(1988), etc, which predicts that retailers would set price for private labels at 
lower stable level. 
Lettuce prices at the shipping point account only 15 to 27 percent of retail prices. 
The four statistics of retail prices for lettuce and fresh-cut IBB salads are approximately 
proportionate to the four statistics of shipping-point prices for lettuce. This may suggest 
that retail prices for fresh-cut IBB salads and lettuce move with shipping-point prices for 
lettuce. 
Table 2 reports the number of observations within certain categories, the 
percentage of observations at, above, and below the annual mode. It also reports the 
number of observations that were above (below) annual modal price by 10 or 20 percent. 
An annual mode is computed for every one UPC or PUL code carried by each retailer for 
each year.  Twenty-three to forty-five percent of time, retail prices for salads are at their 
annual modes (expect for fresh-cut IBB salads, and private label salad blends. If retail 
prices are away from their mode, they tend to go downward by 53 to 85 percent of time. 
In particular, the variation that  retail prices are off annual model prices by 20 percent, 
accounts for 10 to 69 percent of annual retail price variation. On the contrary, shipping-
point prices are not at their annual prices most of the time. When they are away from the 
annual modal prices, they changes to both directions more symmetrically. We define a 
temporary price reduction occurs when retail price of a product is below it annual modal 
price by at least 10 or 20 percent.    13
The last column of lower panel in table 2 reports the volume sales of each 
category in total salad volume sales. Although lettuce has larger shares than bagged 
salads, retail prices remain more stable than retail price for bagged salads. For IBB salads, 
brands that have higher market shares tend to more temporary price reduction. However, 
private labels with the smallest market shares of salad blends have the most frequent 
temporary price reductions. 
The patterns of temporary price reductions are further illustrated in Figure 1, 
where four panels display histograms for retail price indices and shipping-point prices. 
The definition of retail price indices is defined by the ratio of retail price over it annual 
modal prices, followed by Hosken and Reiffen (2004a). The general information remains, 
a) retail prices are at annual modal prices to a large extent, b) retail prices for bagged 
salads have tendency to decrease, c) national brands engage in more price variations 
(downward) in more popular product categories, while brands with smaller market shares 
more likely to conduct price reductions for the less popular products.  
The above discussion is based on product categories. Sexton, Zhang, and Chalfant 
(2003) show that there is a large degree of retail price heterogeneity for IBB salads across 
retailers within a market area. Table 3 reports summary statistics of retail prices for IBB 
salads at UPC level and retail prices for lettuce in Los Angeles. The product category and 
the market chosen represent the general pattern of retailer pricing behavior revealed for 
other products and in other markets. First, retailers differentiate themselves via product 
choice. Notice that none of the retailers have the same set of brands and product lines. 
The means and standard deviations are close for the same product sold at different retail 
accounts. Therefore, we further examine the correlations of the same price series   14
presented n table 3.  Table 4 reports the correlations of retail prices between brands and 
between retail stores, the correlations of retail prices between bagged salads, lettuce, and 
the correlations between retail prices and shipping-point prices. The shaded numbers are 
the correlations between retail prices of the products sold by the same retailer. The 
bolded numbers are the correlations between retail prices of the same brand, or the same 
size. Retail prices for bagged salads are less correlated with other prices series, such as 
retail prices of other IBB product sold by the same retailer, retail prices of the same 
product sold by other retailers, retail prices of the same brand or same size, lettuce prices, 
and shipping-point prices. Surprisingly, sixteen out of twenty-six price correlations 
between retail prices for bagged salad and shipping-point prices are negative.  However, 
in the lower panel of table 4, it shows that retail prices for lettuce are higher correlated 
with each, and they are positively correlated with shipping-point prices to considerable 
extent. 
 
IV  Empirical Models 
We apply both a retailer pricing model and models for retailers’ sales decision to examine 
both changes in mean levels of retail prices, and changes in variability of retail prices. A 
retail pricing model is applied to examine how cost variations and common shocks affect 
retail prices. Retailers’ decisions on temporary price reductions will be modeled in terms 
of product choice (i.e., which product to offer a discount) and the depth of price discounts 
(i.e., how much to discount). Sources that may explain retail price variability are 
decomposed into one associated with retailer sale strategies and the other related to cost 
variations.    15
 
 
1.  A retailer pricing model 
Let product i belong to subcategory s and brand b, and account a denote a city-chain pair, 
e.g., Los Angeles-Albertsons. Retailer prices are postulated as a function of shipping-
point prices, seasonal shocks, unobserved retailer and city-specific characteristics, and 
unobserved brand, categorical, or idiosyncratic product characteristics. A retailer pricing 
model can be written as 
(1)  iat t i t i a iat w p ε β α α α + + + + = , 2  
where piat is the price of product i sold at retail account at week. Each retail account-
product combination comprises a price series. There are 375 price series in the sample, 
and each one of them has more than 60 observations during 1998—1999 (104 
observations in total). wi,t denotes the weekly shipping-point prices for corresponding 
lettuce products and bagged salad items at the retail level. εiat is the error terms, which are 
assumed to be heterskedastic with mean zero and different variance for each price series. 
Further, we allow cluster at the market level and allow the error terms of price series with 
in the same market area to be correlated. αs and βs are the parameters to be estimated. αa 
is a vector of account fixed effects. αi is a vector of dummies for product at UPC level, 
which can be decomposed to broader brand and subcategorical representation. αt is a 
vector of time-related control variables including yearly, monthly, and holiday dummies.   16
We further examine the seasonal patterns of shipping-point prices by estimate 
shipping point prices as a linear function of time-related dummy variables. This helps to 
understand the seasonal patterns (if any) of retail prices. 
2.  Retailers’ choice for temporary price reductions 
A logit model for the probability of temporary price reductions/sales is applied to analyze 
retailers’ decisions on temporary price reductions/sales with respect to product choice. 
Retailers’ decision on which product to offer a discount/sale fits naturally into discrete 
choice models that describe decision makers’ choices among alternatives. Consider a 
pooled estimation for the probability of temporary price reductions for all the retailers in 
all the cities Account a’s decision on offering product i a temporary price reduction in 
week t can be described by 
(2) iat t i city i t i a iat e FOB Popularity I + + + + + = , 2 , 1 γ γ η η η          
where Iiat  equal to one indicates that account a conducts a price discount for product i in 
week t, otherwise Iiat  equal to zero. Popularityi,city denotes the market share of product i 
in a given city. The market shares are calculated as the share of volume sales of product i 
with respective to volume sales of salads including bagged salads and lettuce for each 
quarter. The original measurements are units, i.e., bags for bagged salads, and heads for 
lettuce at both retail and shipping-point levels. Unit sales are converted to volume sales 
by pounds according to the product description for bagged salads, and according to 
packing rules (data description) for lettuce by USDA –SMNS. The error term has the 
same structure assumed in the retailer pricing model, except that we assume its 
distribution is extreme value by logit.  
The following discussion is applied for both retailer pricing models and the model   17
for retailers’ sales decision. First, consider retailers’ decisions on temporary price 
reductions in response to demand and cost variations. Seasonality is introduced by 
monthly and holiday dummies to account for seasonal demand and supply shocks. The 
farm-level prices for lettuce and their lags are also included, considering the possible 
lagged response of retail prices to changes in the farm-level prices. If temporary price 
reductions reflect changes in costs, or changes in the farm-level prices effectively pass 
through to retailers, we expect β3 to be negative implying the probability of temporary 
price reductions is higher when the farm-level prices for lettuce are lower. Otherwise, we 
suggest that temporary price reductions do not reflect decreases in costs. 
Second, if the sale probability is positively correlated to product popularity as 
predicted by Lal and Matutes (1994) and Hosken and Reiffen (2004b), we expect 
monthly dummies in summer and holiday dummies to be positive.
7 Sales comprise a 
subset of temporary price reductions. Therefore, the probability of temporary price 
reductions is higher when the sale probability is higher. If the probability of temporary 
price reductions is not related to cost variations, and it is higher during periods of peak 
demand, we suggest that temporary price reductions reflect changes in the retail margins, 
i.e., retailer sale strategies, rather than changes in costs. 
Third, a second regression can be conducted to estimate group-specific β3 for 
lettuce (β3,l), and private labels (β3,p) and national brands (β3,n) of bagged salads by 
leaving out a brand specialized in organic salads (Earthbound Farm). If β3,l and/or β3,p are 
negative, and β3,n is not significant different from zero; or if all of the three parameters 
are negative, and β3,l and/or β3,p are significantly larger in absolute value terms than β3,n, 
                                                 
7 Demands for bagged salads were high during May and September, and peaked in May and/or August in 
five of the six cities according to our data.    18
we suggest that changes in the farm-level prices for lettuce contribute more to temporary 
price reductions for lettuce and/or private-labels of bagged salads than those for national 
brands of bagged salads. 
Further, we will look into other factors that explain temporary price reductions as 
the result of retailer sale strategies. First, if a product’s sale probability is higher when the 
product is more popular as predicated by Lal and Matutes (1994) and Hosken and Reiffen 
(2004b), we expect β1 to be positive. Second, another regression will be applied to obtain 
group-specific β1 for lettuce (β1,l), and private labels (β1,p) and national brands (β1,n) of 
bagged salads. We expect β1,n to be positive, and the dummy variable for private labels to 
be negative. Narasimhan (1988), Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal (1990), Rao (1991), and 
Agrawal (1996) predict that retailers are least motivated to conduct price promotions for 
private labels compared to national brands. Therefore, the unobserved characteristics of 
private labels except for their market shares are expected to have negative effects on their 
sale probability. Further, β1,l is expected to be positive and larger than β1,n, since lettuce is 
more popular than bagged salads according to the data.
8 Otherwise, we would expect that 
other factors, such as the differences in product and market channel characteristics, might 
explain the difference in retailer pricing strategies between lettuce and bagged salads. 
The theoretical literature on price promotions [e.g., Varian (1980), Lal and 
Matutes (1994), Lal and Villas-Boas (1998), and Hosken and Reiffen (2001, 2004b)] 
emphasizes competition between retailers as the fundamental driver of sales. However, 
these theories do not provide explicit implications for the relationship between the degree 
of competitiveness in the retail market and the sale probability. Both the Herfinahl index 
                                                 
8 SZC (2003) find that retail prices for iceberg lettuce have smaller variance than retail prices for iceberg-
based bagged salads, and some stores tend to maintain very stable lettuce prices.   19
and its squared term are included to capture the first- and second-order effects of retail 
competition. Further, the chain size of each account and account fixed effects are 
included to capture the observed and unobserved account characteristics. We expect the 
coefficients of account characteristics to be significantly different from zero, implying 
that retailers’ characteristics have significant effects on retailer pricing strategies. 
3.  Depth of temporary price reductions 
Retailers’ decisions on temporary price reductions about how much to discount can be 
evaluated by the following regression 
iat iat v Z P + = ∆ ' θ , where 
r
ia iat iat P P P − = ∆                                                        (3) 
Given product i is offered a temporary price reduction in week t,  iat P ∆  is the 
difference between the retail price of product i at account a in week t ( iat P ), and its 
regular price (
r
ia P ). Explanatory variables, Z, are similar to those included in the models 
of retailers’ decisions on temporary price reductions/sales with respect to product choice. 
θ denotes the parameters to be estimated.  
 
V  Results 
Table 5 reports the estimation results from retailer pricing model and shipping-point price 
model. The models explain 58 percent of variations in retail prices, and 42 percent of 
variations in shipping-point prices. Shipping-point prices explain 14.8 percent changes in 
retail prices of salad products at 99 percent significance level. Compared to the base 
month—January, retail prices of salad items are significantly higher during May and July, 
and in December. However, shipping-point prices for lettuce are lower during the same   20
months except in May compared to shipping-point prices in January, although none of the 
coefficients for these four months are statistically significant. On the other hand, retail 
prices in February and March (April) are not significantly different from those in January, 
although shipping-point prices are lower (higher) than those in January at 90 (99) percent 
significance level. Therefore, the estimates suggest that retail prices either do not respond 
to changes in shipping-point prices or move in the opposite direction of shipping-point 
prices.  
Estimated coefficients for six out of eighteen holiday and national events are 
statistically significant, and five of them are positive. There are six holiday dummies 
statistically significant in the shipping-point price estimation, and four of them are 
negative. This may explained by the fact that these negative coefficients occur during the 
production peak season. Hence, estimated coefficients for monthly and holiday dummy 
variables do not support the predictions of Lal and Matutes (1994), Hosken and Reffein 
(2001, 2004b), and are not consistent with findings by Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi, 
(2003). 
The category and brand characteristics show that IBB salads have significantly 
lower mean than salad blends by pair-wise F tests. The omitted group is red leaf lettuce. 
Retail prices are measured by $/bag. Since most salad blend items have smaller 
sizes(mostly 5oz, 8oz, 12oz) than IBB salads (mostly 12 oz, 16 oz, 32 oz). The unit prices 
for bagged salads are much higher than those for IBB salads when taking sizes into 
consideration. Tests of joint equality of brand-category variables are rejected for both 
IBB salads and salad blends (F(4, 5) =  614.64, p-value=0.000 for salad blends; F(4, 5) =  
215.66, p-value=0.000 for IBB salads). Pair-wise tests for equality of retail prices of   21
private labels, Ready Pac, and fresh-cut IBB salads, which are lower compared to Dole 
and Fresh Express, do not strong support the hypothesis that private label and/or fresh-cut 
IBB salads have lower price levels than national brands.
9 
Table 6 reports estimation results for a Logit model for retailers’ sales decision on 
product choice (on the left), and estimation results of a linear model for retailers’ sales 
decision on the depth of discounts. In particular, odds ratio are reported for Logit 
estimates. Shipping-point prices do not statistically significant effects on product choice 
decision. However, once a product is chosen as a sale item, the discounts are lighter when 
shipping-point prices are lower. Product popularity has statistically significantly 
positively effects on retailers’ sales decision on product choice and statistically negative 
effects on the extent of sales. In particular, 1.1 percent increase in market shares of a 
product increases the probability of putting the product on sale by one percent.  
The size of a salad blend item does not matter much to retailers’ sales decision, 
since salad blend items are usually differentiated by their contents. However, the size of 
IBB salads is an important factor explaining retailers’ sales decision. The most popular 
sizes of IBB salads are medium-sizes, e.g., 12 oz and 16 oz IBB salad. The medium-size 
IBB salads are more frequently on sales compared with other sized items, while with 
mild price cuts. On contrary, IBB items with smaller or large sizes are put on sale less 
often then medium-size IBB items, but they received large discounts once they are on 
sale.   
The probability of sales practices is higher during May and July, September to 
December. Furthermore, sales during these months are also accompanied by deeper 
                                                 
9 Test results are: Ready Pac vs. private label: F(  1,     5)= 0.01, p-value=0.929; Ready Pac vs. fresh-cut: 
F(1,5)=12.76, p-value=0.0001; private label vs. fresh-cut: F(1,5) =0.81, p-value= 0.409.   22
discounts. Recall that retail prices are significantly higher during the May and July in our 
retailer pricing model. This suggests that retailers may response to decrease in purchasing 
prices of lettuce during seasonal production peaks by increase price variability via sales 
practice, rather than adjust mean levels of retail prices. President Day, Veteran’s Day, 
Easter Sunday, Independence Day, and Thanksgiving Day are associated with 
significantly higher sales probability of salad items, the latter three holidays also receive 
significantly larger discounts.  
The IBB salad items are more likely to be on sales for all brands compared to 
salad blend items, although the depth of discounts is smaller. On the other hand, iceberg 
lettuce that has the largest shares of salad sales, is not more likely to be the sale item. If 
iceberg lettuce is on sales, the price cuts are significantly higher. 
Although there are many interesting empirical findings in the logit model for 
retailers’ sales decision on product choice, the models only explains less than tenth (R-
squared is 0.091 for the Logit model, and is 0.075 for the linear model) of retailers’ sales 
behavior in terms of product choice. There are more of retailers’ pricing behavior to be 
understood.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for Salad Retail Prices by Brand and Subcategories 
(Prices are measured by $/unit for bagged salad, and $/head for lettuce) 
Subcategory Brand  Mean  St.d  Range  P75-P50 
Bagged  salads        
Iceberg-based  salads        
  Dole  2.19 0.72 3.18 1.00 
  Fresh  Express  2.18 0.90 4.61 1.28 
  Ready  Pac  2.01 0.89 3.40 1.20 
  Private  Labels  2.00 0.62 2.26 1.10 
  Fresh-cut  2.03 0.22 1.11 0.31 
Salad  blends        
  Dole  2.69 0.35 3.00 0.40 
  Fresh  Express  2.79 0.37 3.02 0.30 
  Ready  Pac  2.89 0.25 1.82 0.03 
  Private  Labels  2.62 0.60 2.98 0.48 
        
Lettuce        
Iceberg  lettuce  -  1.14 0.20 1.64 0.30 
Leaf  lettuce  -  1.32 0.44 2.51 0.50 
        
Shipping-point  prices        
Iceberg  lettuce  -  0.24 0.11 0.54 0.10 
Leaf  lettuce  -  0.20 0.20 1.47 0.20 
   26
 
Table 2 Price Variations of Bagged Salads and Lettuce 
      Percentage of observations   
Subcategory  Brand  #  of  obs  =mode >mode <mode  
Bagged  salads         
Iceberg-based  salads         
  Dole  3492  22.48 13.34 72.68  
  Fresh  Express  4583  28.37 17.61 60.07  
  Ready  Pac  1028  39.59  25.1 53.7  
 Private  Labels  729  24.42  11.8  63.79   
  Fresh-cut  208  1.92                  98.08   
Salad  blends         
  Dole  7368  24.12 13.55 68.28  
  Fresh  Express  7329  45.27 21.12 55.49  
 Ready  Pac  3303  42.87  8.81  53.19   
 Private  Labels  3027  13.02  6.44  85.73   
         
Lettuce         
Iceberg  lettuce  -  1556  20.57 36.44 42.99  
Leaf  lettuce  -  4648  27.43 33.24 39.33  
         
Shipping-point  prices         
Iceberg  lettuce  -  104  5.77  30.77 63.46  
Leaf lettuce  -  416  10.58  47.6  41.83   
    >mode, by  <mode, by  volume 
Subcategory Brand  10% 20% 10% 20% shares 
Bagged  salads         
Iceberg-based  salads         
 Dole  2.81  1.12  13.29  8.99  9.83 
 Fresh  Express  5.96  3.82  18.39  10.3  6.74 
  Ready  Pac  5.06 2.33 8.07 7.39 4.48 
 Private  Labels  2.47  0.14  10.84  8.09  1.39 
 Fresh-cut      67.79  27.4  8.35 
Salad  blends         
 Dole  6.73  5.48  13.44  8.47  2.09 
 Fresh  Express  3.34  0.22  11.87  8.6  3.09 
 Ready  Pac  1.48    11.35  7.69  2.11 
 Private  Labels  0.56    20.48  10.11  1.36 
         
Lettuce         
Iceberg  lettuce  -  15.17 11.25 16.58 8.8  38.37 
Leaf  lettuce  -  17.04 11.79 11.81 7.12  22.06 
         
Shipping-point  prices         
Iceberg  lettuce  -  19.23 12.5  57.69 44.23  
Leaf  lettuce  -  39.66 31.25 31.25 24.28  
Note: Bagged salads and head lettuce are sold by units by retailers. We convert unit sales to volume sales 
measured by pounds according to production description and suggestions from crop profiles provided by 
USDA.   27
Table 3 Summary Statistics for Retail Prices in Los Angeles 
(Prices are measured by $/unit for bagged salad, and $/head for lettuce) 
 Brand  subcategory  measure  mean St.d  range p75-p59 
Retailer  1           
bagged  salad  Dole  IBB  12oz/unit  1.81 0.27 1.05 0.40 
  Fresh-cut  IBB  32oz/unit  2.08 0.17 0.82 0.27 
lettuce    iceberg  head 1.08 0.23 1.64 0.18 
    romaine head 1.09 0.32 1.91 0.03 
Retailer  2           
bagged  salad  Dole  IBB  12oz/unit  1.96 0.10 0.50 0.01 
  Dole  IBB  16oz/unit  1.63 0.15 0.70 0.02 
  Dole  IBB  32oz/unit  2.38 0.20 0.55 0.02 
lettuce    iceberg  head 0.95 0.15 1.01 0.05 
    romaine head 1.02 0.19 1.29 0.02 
Retailer  3           
bagged  salad  Dole  IBB  12oz/unit  2.02 0.15 0.72 0.00 
  Dole  IBB  16oz/unit  1.58 0.11 0.40 0.20 
  Dole  IBB  32oz/unit  2.69 0.01 0.12 0.00 
  Ready  Pac  IBB  12oz/unit  1.78 0.25 0.52 0.50 
  Ready  Pac  IBB  16oz/unit  1.59 0.10 0.40 0.20 
  Ready  Pac  IBB  32oz/unit  2.64 0.17 0.71 0.01 
lettuce    iceberg  head 1.03 0.18 0.97 0.03 
    romaine head 1.08 0.23 1.18 0.01 
Retailer  4           
bagged salad  Ready Pac  IBB  16oz/unit  1.63  0.12  0.78  0.20 
  Ready  Pac  IBB  32oz/unit  2.67 0.12 0.79 0.00 
lettuce    iceberg  head 1.03 0.20 0.93 0.02 
    romaine head 1.07 0.27 1.70 0.06 
Shipping-point           
    iceberg  head 0.24 0.11 0.54 0.10 
    romaine head 0.28 0.21 1.37 0.14 
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Table 4 Price Correlations in Los Angeles 
Retailer  Ret.  1    Ret.  2    Ret.  3       Ret.  4   
Brand  Dole FreCut  Dole Dole  Dole  Dole  Dole  Dole  RP RP RP RP  RP 
Size  12  32  12  16 32 12  16 32 12 16 32 16  32 
                    
1-DO-12 1.00                  
1-FC-32  0.31  1.00                
2-DO-12  0.05  -0.02  1.00              
2-DO-16 0.19  0.03  0.80  1.00             
2-DO-32 0.37  0.21  0.23  0.43  1.00            
3-DO -12  0.15  -0.12  0.08  0.06  -0.18  1.00          
3- DO -16  0.26  0.17  0.09  0.25  0.51  -0.28  1.00         
3- DO -32  0.09  -0.08  -0.10 -0.11  -0.17  0.10  -0.08  1.00        
3-RP-12  -0.08  -0.18  -0.03  -0.25 -0.45 0.25  -0.78 0.04  1.00         
3-RP-16 0.25  0.21  0.11  0.28  0.56  -0.31  0.94  -0.12 -0.80 1.00       
3-RP-32 0.21  0.09  -0.07  -0.05  -0.14  0.07 0.14  -0.03  -0.23 0.16  1.00     
4-RP-16 0.19  0.08  0.07  0.24  0.64 -0.17 0.34  -0.03 -0.25 0.37  -0.14 1.00   
4-RP-32  -0.16 0.04  -0.02 -0.09  -0.22  0.06  -0.28  -0.02  0.29 -0.27  -0.04  -0.19 1.00 
                    
1-iceberg  -0.10 0.02  0.04  -0.01  -0.36  -0.08 -0.46  0.01 0.24 -0.34  0.10 -0.33 0.10 
1-romaine  -0.17 -0.11  -0.13 -0.14  -0.50  0.32  -0.42  0.15 0.34 -0.39  0.13 -0.37 0.08 
2-iceberg  -0.05 0.19  -0.12 -0.01  -0.23  -0.12 -0.21  0.01 0.13 -0.07  0.10 -0.21 0.10 
2-romaine  -0.14 0.10  -0.45 -0.23  -0.38  0.17  -0.31  0.08 0.23 -0.25  0.06 -0.34 0.06 
3-iceberg  -0.20 -0.04  -0.19 -0.16  -0.54  0.02  -0.42  0.09 0.30 -0.34  0.07 -0.41 0.14 
3-romaine  -0.27 -0.14  -0.19 -0.16  -0.65  0.28  -0.39  0.19 0.31 -0.41  0.12 -0.46 0.06 
shipping-point                    
iceberg  -0.07 0.06  -0.11 -0.06  -0.21  -0.08 -0.31  -0.02  0.11 -0.29  0.12 -0.10 0.04 
romaine  -0.24 -0.09  -0.09 -0.07  -0.42  0.03  -0.19  0.12 0.06 -0.21  0.17 -0.25 0.00 
  
  Ret.1   Ret.2   Ret.3   shipping  point 
 iceberg  romaine  iceberg  romaine  iceberg romaine  iceberg  romaine 
lettuce           
1-iceberg  1.00          
1-romaine  0.65 1.00            
2-iceberg  0.60 0.62 1.00          
2-romaine  0.53 0.70 0.75 1.00        
3-iceberg  0.76 0.86 0.72 0.74 1.00      
3-romaine  0.55 0.87 0.56 0.72 0.85 1.00    
shipping-point           
iceberg 0.59 0.45 0.36 0.32 0.45 0.37 1.00   
romaine 0.55 0.75 0.46 0.47 0.70 0.68 0.58  1.00 
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Table 5 Estimation Results for Retailer Pricing Model and Shipping-point Price Model 
Retailer Pricing Model  Shipping-point Price Model 
 Coefficient  Std.  Err.   Coefficient  Std.  Err. 
Dependent variable      Dependent variable     
retail  price     shipping-point  price    
         
Explanatory variables      Explanatory variables     
shipping-point price   0.148***  0.033       
         
year=1999 0.041**  0.011  year=1999  -0.086**  0.023 
Month     Month    
Feb 0.032  0.022  Feb  -0.079*  0.031 
Mar 0.016  0.027  Mar  -0.062*  0.027 
Apr -0.008  0.024  Apr  0.275***  0.032 
May 0.053***  0.010  May  0.065  0.044 
June 0.046**  0.013  June  -0.049  0.040 
July 0.046*  0.021  July  -0.032  0.042 
August 0.030  0.016  August  -0.002  0.038 
September  0.031 0.021  September  0.079 0.057 
October  0.026 0.013  October  0.063 0.056 
November 0.037  0.022  November  -0.041  0.040 
December 0.060**  0.020  December -0.067  0.036 
Holidays     Holidays    
Christmas  -0.036 0.040  Christmas  -0.019 0.013 
New Year  0.034  0.018  New Year  0.046**  0.011 
Martin Luther King  0.038  0.027  Martin Luther King  -0.009  0.010 
Super Bowl  0.040*  0.018  Super Bowl  -0.077**  0.026 
President Day  -0.049**  0.016  President Day  -0.006  0.021 
Cino de Mayo  -0.021  0.014  Cino de Mayo  0.366**  0.094 
Easter Sunday  0.040*  0.020  Easter Sunday  -0.062*  0.028 
Mother's Day  0.037*  0.018  Mother's Day  -0.093**  0.022 
Memorial Day  -0.013  0.016  Memorial Day  -0.072  0.036 
Father's Day  0.001  0.013  Father's Day  -0.019  0.009 
Independence Day  0.031**  0.011  Independence Day  -0.009  0.013 
Labor Day  0.015  0.012  Labor Day  -0.021*  0.008 
Columbus Day  -0.009  0.014  Columbus Day  0.028**  0.009 
Halloween -0.023  0.015  Halloween  0.003  0.014 
Veteran's Day  0.022  0.012  Veteran's Day  -0.006  0.005 
Thanksgiving 0.028***  0.007  Thanksgiving  -0.007  0.008 
Product-related     Product-related    
Dole-blend 1.588***  0.077       
Dole-IBB 1.081***  0.153       
FE-blend 1.581***  0.053       
FE-IBB 0.974***  0.061       
FreCut-IBB 1.051***  0.068       
PRV-blend 1.461***  0.051       
PRV-ice 0.912***  0.159       
RP-blend 1.805***  0.065       
RP-ice 0.906***  0.048  Boston  -0.017***  0.000   30
         
iceberg -0.096*  0.046  iceberg  -0.045***  0.000 
romaine 0.016  0.016  romaine  omitted   
green leaf  -0.002  0.001  green leaf  -0.021***  0.000 
red leaf  Omitted    red leaf  -0.034***  0.000 
         
constant 1.188***  0.078  constant  0.312  0.044 
         
Number of observations  36607    Number of observations  520   
Number of clusters  6    Number of clusters  5   
R-squared  0.583   R-squared  0.417  
Root MSE  0.508    Root MSE  0.138   
Note: One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, 
respectively.   31
Table 6 Estimation Results Models of Temporary Price Reductions: 
    Product Choice and Depth of Discounts 
Logit Model for Product Choice  Linear Model for Depth of Discounts 
  Odds Radio  Std. Err.    Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Dependent variable      Dependent variable     
Sales     depth  of  discounts     
         
Explanatory variables      Explanatory variables     
shipping-point price  1.028  0.243  Shipping-point price  -0.010  0.018 
market shares  1.089***  0.028  market shares  -0.013**  0.004 
          
Size     Size     
Salad blend-58oz  1.316  0.601  Salad blend-58oz  0.008  0.045 
Salad bland-10-12oz  1.794  0.853  Salad bland-10-12oz  -0.023  0.044 
Salad blend-15oz  1.154  1.251  Salad blend-15oz  -0.019  0.103 
Salad blend-24pz  1.765  1.638  Salad blend-24pz  -0.092  0.151 
IBB-6oz 0.275**  0.170  IBB-6oz  0.169***  0.039 
IBB-10-12oz 0.485**  0.153  IBB-10-12oz  0.077**  0.011 
IBB-16oz 0.413*  0.209  IBB-16oz  0.125***  0.035 
IBB-32oz 0.183***  0.078  IBB-32oz  0.155***  0.025 
IBB-48oz 0.144**  0.118  IBB-48oz  0.151**  0.047 
          
year=1999 0.898  0.115  year=1999  0.005  0.010 
Month     Month     
Feb 0.897  0.170  Feb  0.039*  0.016 
Mar 0.883  0.177  Mar  0.035  0.021 
Apr 0.829  0.221  Apr  0.037  0.029 
May 0.617**  0.126  May  0.050***  0.015 
June 0.723*  0.132  June  0.048**  0.018 
July 0.610*  0.168  July  0.060**  0.022 
August 0.722  0.177  August  0.048**  0.020 
September 0.597**  0.149  September  0.055*  0.018 
October 0.637**  0.121  October  0.050**  0.015 
November 0.794*  0.099  November  0.039  0.021 
December 0.753**  0.097  December 0.046**  0.013 
Holidays     Holidays     
Christmas 1.289  0.317  Christmas  -0.032  0.026 
New Year  0.835  0.115  New Year  0.022  0.014 
Martin Luther King  0.954  0.256  Martin Luther King  0.021  0.030 
Super Bowl  0.921  0.190  Super Bowl  0.033  0.019 
President Day  1.399**  0.230  President Day  -0.040  0.020 
Cinco de Mayo  0.976  0.097  Cinco de Mayo  0.008  0.007 
Easter Sunday  0.696*  0.136  Easter Sunday  0.037**  0.013 
Mother's Day  0.771  0.176  Mother's Day  0.017  0.019 
Memorial Day  1.188  0.157  Memorial Day  -0.001  0.012 
Father's Day  0.998  0.150  Father's Day  0.003  0.015 
Independence Day  0.694***  0.057  Independence Day  0.025**  0.009 
Labor Day  0.938  0.106  Labor Day  0.008  0.008 
Columbus Day  0.874  0.149  Columbus Day  0.010  0.013   32
          
Halloween 1.065  0.137  Halloween  -0.020  0.014 
Veteran's Day  0.771***  0.055  Veteran's Day  0.019  0.011 
Thanksgiving 0.751***  0.052  Thanksgiving  0.025***  0.006 
Product-related     Product-related    
Dole-blend 0.629  0.254  Dole-blend  -0.064  0.050 
Dole-IBB 2.464*  1.162  Dole-IBB  -0.159***  0.018 
FE-blend 0.594  0.227  FE-blend  -0.058  0.048 
FE-IBB 4.336***  2.065  FE-IBB  -0.182***  0.032 
FreCut-IBB 11.764***  7.574  FreCut-IBB -0.174**  0.068 
PRV-blend 0.938  0.348  PRV-blend  -0.055  0.034 
PRV-ice 1.327  0.478  PRV-ice  -0.069***  0.007 
RP-blend 0.746  0.265  RP-blend  -0.076*  0.034 
RP-ice 4.596***  1.801  RP-ice  -0.189***  0.022 
Iceberg 0.603  0.323  Iceberg  0.096**  0.029 
Green leaf  0.566**  0.148  Green leaf  0.022  0.010 
Romaine 0.900  0.362  Romaine  0.028  0.022 
          
Number of observations  36191    Number of observations  36607   
Number of clusters  6    Number of clusters  6   
Pseudo R-squared  0.091    R-squared  0.075   
     Root  MSE  0.237   
Note: One, two, and three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1 Histograms for Retail Price Indices  and Shipping-point Prices 
 
Panel (a) Iceberg-based bagged salads 
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Panel (b) Salad Blends 
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Panel (c) Lettuce at retail accounts 
 







































Panel (d) Shipping-point price for lettuce 
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